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The Return of the Future and Questions about Knowledge

This article addresses some issues of the relationships between the imaginary and knowledge – and more specifically, between the historical-critical imaginary and historical-critical knowledge. In view of recent trends in world conflicts and in the debate on capitalism and globalization, in a certain sense the subject is the implications of a return to the future as regards the production of knowledge.

Many, if not all, observers may agree that everyone in the world opposed to capitalism or who resisted or rivalled imperialism had been defeated by the late 1980s. The specificity of that defeat consists, in my opinion, of the extinction of a particular horizon of the future. Allow me to explain.

During the last 500 years, i.e. since America came into being, there has always been a brilliant horizon visible to everyone around the world, shining with promises at certain times: modernity, rationality, progress, liberalism, nationalism, socialism. The time that this horizon announced or promised was far more than a mere continuation of the present and the past. It was something new, it involved change, and it announced or promised what was desired or hoped for, perhaps even dreamt about. In any event, it created a different meaning for each history, in each space/time.

For that reason, the numerous defeats of the countless struggles and the many peoples who strove to achieve some of those goals were always understood as transitory, and often as of limited scope or historical duration; never were they accepted as final or definitive. The horizon was still there before us, the long-sought future was still there undefeated, its brilliance increasing with the passage of time after each defeat. What is more, a great many victories were won in the last three centuries. The worst forms of exploitation were circumscribed. In some parts of the world, the dominant powers were forced to admit – or at least negotiate – the limits, conditions, and forms of domination and exploitation. That was how what we now call bourgeois

democracy came into being, with the modern nation-state as its institutional structure. Nearly all the great colonial empires were destroyed. And at one time it even seemed that domination and exploitation had really begun, in certain parts of the world, to be overcome. These victories only confirmed the powerful certainty that the struggles were focused on a real future horizon, not a deceptive dream. In the light of that hope, every defeat was a mere momentary incident in the fight. That is why millions of people were able to bear everything: exile, imprisonment, torture, death and even the most personal and painful of all oppressions, the sacrifice or death of loved ones.

I feel sure that many of you have personal knowledge of this, country by country. Or you may have wondered how the defeated of the Spanish Civil War felt – an entire generation of revolutionaries from all over the world, fearing or knowing that the time of defeat would be very long. But there is no testimony from those years implying a renunciation of the path lighted by the horizon. ‘If mother Spain falls – I say, it is a saying – go out, children of the world; go out to look for it!’ said Vallejo (‘Spain, take this cup from me’, 1937). But he was sure that the children of the world would go out to look for it. Latin America’s analogous collective experience was probably the fall of Allende in Chile in 1973, preceded by the defeat of the Popular Congress in Bolivia in 1972.

It is not my aim, on this occasion, to enquire into the causes of these defeats. What I propose to do, in the first place, is to point out that the brightest horizon of the age began to lose its radiance – and no longer just for a small and isolated minority as at times in the past – from the late 1960s (Shanghai 1967, Paris 1968, Tlatelolco 1968, Prague 1969), and that between the mid-1970s when the world crisis of capitalism broke out and the late 1980s when ‘the wall came down’ and the ‘socialist camp’ collapsed, the light went out completely, throughout the world. And in the second place, I want to enquire into the implications of that development for the questions about knowledge.

On the first point, I think few will deny that all the political movements, organizations and regimes seeking a significant deconcentration of power or a radical redistribution thereof, had been defeated throughout the world by the end of the 1980s. All of them were extinguished. And with them was also extinguished through the 1990s – not only dimmed – the specific horizon of future, unless someone were seriously to posit that neoliberalism was that horizon. For some of the neoliberal thinkers, indeed, history had come to an end (see Fukuyama’s [1992] *The End of History and the Last Man*).¹ For the first time in 500 years the most admirable dreams of the human species appeared to be dead and buried. With hope lost, fear darkened the horizon once again.²

Such an extinction of any horizon of future implied for many, perhaps for most, the disquieting sensation that the ideas, proposals, promises and

reasons for radical redistribution of power and radical historical changes in social existence suddenly appeared to belong to some remote past. Then all the intellectual perspectives and theoretical categories associated with those proposals and promises were also abruptly abandoned. In short, everything that was recognized as 'critical thought' or 'critical theory' was left without, or almost without, debate. In Latin America in particular, the only debate, if any, took place around the 'crisis of paradigms' in social knowledge.

The issues suggested by all of this are many and very important. On this occasion I would like to focus on only two: first, on the relations between the historical perspectives of the imaginary and knowledge, and second, on something more complex – the relations between the imaginary dimension, social action and the forms of production of knowledge.

The Imaginary Dimension and the Knowledge Dimension

The idea of a future horizon as a new time for social existence, and hence, as the bearer of a new understanding of history, whether total or partial, radical or superficial, clearly points to a specific perspective on the imaginary dimension: that of a historical imaginary, which is far different from a mystical or magical imaginary which might transcend history.

The historic imaginary perspective which has been dominant throughout the world until very recently was born in the Americas, though its core expression was elaborated in Europe. It implied a genuine mutation of intersubjective relations among the populations of the world: acceptance of continuous change not only as a normal historical behaviour but as something at once necessary and desirable. That in turn meant, for Europe in particular, the abandonment of the past as a golden age of humanity, in favour of an embrace of the future as the continent of hope.³

I want to stress two points about this specific perspective on the imaginary dimension: (1) the idea of modernity/ rationality, associated with the ideas of progress and the market; and (2) the idea of democracy as a concrete social interest, as the highest expression of modernity.⁴

This time I do not go very far in this enquiry. My interest lies in observing that, in the absence of these ideas/images, certain questions posed to social 'reality', i.e. to social experience, and first of all to power, no elaboration of the respective questions, no search for the components of 'reality' in which to find parts of the answer, no fields of relationships which are established or discovered in that search and no explanations and meanings elaborated for those answers will be possible. Or, it would be possible to do so in a very different way from the one that has led to the establishment of 'critical' thought, the perspective on knowledge that made the power of capital the chief object of scientific research, debate and theory for nearly two centuries.

In other words, I suggest that the perspective on knowledge implied in 'critical thought' and 'critical theory of society' was a companion and a partner to an equally 'critical' imaginary, which took root together with modernity.

The Imaginary Dimension and History

What made these perspectives on the imaginary dimension and knowledge develop together and then collapse and die out together? If the questions asked by the second stemmed from the first, could it be said that the extinction of this specific future horizon was what dragged down the perspective on knowledge that was tied to it? Or was it just the reverse? Was the defeat of the social action inspired by this perspective on knowledge what led to the extinction of the perspective on imagination with which it was so closely associated?

The extinction of an entire horizon on the future, or a perspective on the historical imagination, cannot be explained exclusively by far-reaching changes in the intersubjective sources from which it sprang. But the same unquestionably holds true for what happens or may happen to a given perspective on social historical knowledge. In other words, what I am suggesting is that the intersubjective sources which fed the currents of the specific historical imaginary – which might be called 'critical' – and those of the 'critical' social knowledge with which it was associated have been drying up or undergoing profound change. On both sides, this is without doubt a major victory for capitalism.

Does it follow from this that capitalism has simply won out, because it is invincible? And that, as is asserted in 'postmodernist' thought, this critique and its proposals and projects were never more than a chimerical 'grand narrative' and that it must be accepted that power is either a theoretically irrelevant abstraction or an unchanging datum of life as it is, and in regard to which it is therefore senseless to search for the most appropriate crevices in which to play with individual freedom – as is stated today in a postmodernist reading of Foucault?

In society, power is a social relationship comprised of an uninterrupted weave of three components: domination/exploitation/conflict over the control of key areas of human social existence: (1) work and its resources and products; (2) sex and its resources and products; (3) collective authority and its resources and products; and, finally, (4) subjectivity/intersubjectivity, and especially the imaginary and the mode of producing knowledge (Quijano, forthcoming). These three components of all power relations are there in differing degrees and forms depending on the concrete situations and space/times, configuring a given pattern of power in each case. The one which

is articulated around capitalism has turned out to be stronger than its adversaries to date. But that is not necessarily a demonstration of its invincibility; it is rather an indication of a relationship of forces which leads to the following question on its adversaries' power pattern: where does its weakness lie?

I suggest beginning the search for an answer by asking another, indispensable, question: can a historical imaginary, and particularly a 'critical' one, live and develop over a long period of time without being able to boast victories in concrete experience? Probably not. Better put, undoubtedly not, because a historical imaginary is not the same as a mystical or magical one, which posits a universe that transcends concrete reality. As regards the latter, concrete experience either does not serve as the needed point of reference, because the imaginary dimension transcends it, or is always a continuous demonstration of the imaginary's truth. To illustrate, for a person who believes that the universe was 'created' by God, experience is a continuous demonstration of that belief. However, for one who believes in the 'immaculate conception', experience is wholly irrelevant. But both beliefs are proper to a single mystical imaginary.

From this point of view, it is neither arbitrary nor irrelevant to suggest that the originally close ties between the historical-critical imaginary and concrete historical experience, ties which could almost be described as symmetrical from the 18th- and 19th-century European perspective and especially in regard to the ideas/images of modernity, rationality and progress, tended to break apart over the course of the 20th century, especially in relation to the ideas/images of revolution and socialism. And that separation has led to a steady frustration and an ultimate subordination of the subjectivity linked to that imaginary. That is, a part of the concrete experience of the 20th century – precisely the part linked to the hegemonic force, and therefore the one responsible for the defeats or victories – tended to orient itself and develop in a direction distinct from that of the critical imaginary. And consequently, the actions taken to make that imaginary real were defeated, or far worse, were in fact victories that led elsewhere than imagined.⁵

A brief historical anecdote may be useful here. Since very early in the 20th century there has been a progressive reduction of opportunity for debate and activity by those social movements for which the struggle to control the nation-state is not the path leading to the future horizon where domination and exploitation will cease to be the core of social organization. In their place came 'historical materialism' as the hegemonic model worldwide, and since the so-called socialist revolution in Russia in October 1917 even the current that conserved the original political name 'social democracy' gave way in terms of worldwide hegemony to the one that adopted the name 'Marxism-Leninism'. This was the current which came to dominate the movement throughout the world from its base in the new Russian state, as from 1924.

For this ideological current, the state is the core of the revolution in society and its capture and control are therefore the revolution's key task. Especially since the defeat of the Spanish Republic, the opportunity available to opposing currents has been reduced to such an extent that, for the great majority of the world's population, they simply do not exist.

It is well known that from 1917 some important minorities expressed radical critiques of the nature and future of the new power installed in Russia, which claimed to be revolutionary and socialist. In the 1917–20 period, Rosa Luxemburg denounced the new power's despotism; Anton Pannekoek, Hermann Gorter, Paul Mattick and others exposed the bureaucratic counter-revolution; Rodolfo Mondolfo described the system of state capitalism that had usurped socialism's place.⁶ And from 1927, Trotsky and his followers more than any others denounced, first, the 'bureaucratic deformations', and then the crimes committed in the 'trials', though they nevertheless acknowledged the presence of a 'workers' state'.⁷ But in spite of all the critiques, Trotsky's assassination, the experience of the Moscow 'trials' and the forced labour camps, Russia and the Bolsheviks were able to establish an authentic prestige among revolutionaries worldwide. In particular, its support for the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles throughout the world made the Soviet Union a worldwide pole of attraction and political guidance, and its prestige and influence only increased after the Second World War and the formation of the 'socialist camp' including all the countries of Eastern Europe, China after the revolution of 1949 and Cuba from 1962.

But not long after the Second World War, a sequence of events occurred in the 'socialist camp' which began to reintroduce doubt as to the true nature of that 'camp' regarding the horizon of future: the anti-capitalist 'critical imaginary'. And since, the doubts have only grown and deepened. First came Tito's (and Yugoslavia's) break with Stalin and the USSR, and within Yugoslavia itself the dissidence which described the dominant bureaucracy as a 'new class' (Djilas, 1957). Then came the workers' revolt in East Berlin in 1953, so brutally repressed that Brecht did not hesitate to make public his ferocious irony: if the state was so unhappy with its citizens, it should choose others. Not long thereafter, in 1956, a revolution broke out in Hungary and 'Soviet' tanks were called upon to crush it in a bloody repression. And to all these events were soon added the repeated worker revolts in Poland during the 1950s and 1960s.

Following each of these events, many intellectuals associated with the Communist parties in many places (but especially in Europe) broke with those parties. After the Hungarian uprising it was estimated that about 6000 European intellectuals abandoned them (I recall the terribly sad balance sheet drawn up in *La Somme et la reste* by Henri Lefevre). The great majority, however, did not cease to be Marxists and socialists, or to conserve their sympathy towards the so-called USSR. Doubt was consolidated when,

following Stalin's death, confirmation of the accusations of despotism, criminality and abuses by the Stalinist regime began to emerge from within the dominant nomenklatura itself. The famous Khrushchev Report to the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress had a devastating impact, even though the Stalinist parties sought to explain it all away with the ineffable 'personality cult' formula. After the Sino-Soviet split came an expansion of Maoist influence as a substitute for Stalinism. But the massacre of the Shanghai Commune in 1967, ordered by Mao himself, revealed the orientation and future course of the Chinese regime. The final sequence of events leading from the repression and occupation of Prague by the same Soviet tanks in 1969, liquidating what had promised to be a democratic liberalization of the bureaucratic despotism, through the ultimately successful revolt of the Solidarity workers in Poland in 1976 despite General Jaruzelski's Stalinist coup d'état, to the 'fall of the wall' in Berlin in 1989 and the disintegration of the 'socialist camp' is doubtless still fresh in the memory of all and requires no further commentary.

This sequence lasted long enough to show the world the true nature of the power imposed in Russia and the entire 'socialist camp' since October 1917. Its governing minority – as is clear from what it has done everywhere after the 'fall' – during that period was more and more interested in the privatization of power, not in its destruction.⁸ And due to the dissidents, as the critical revolutionary currents in the countries of the 'socialist camp' were called, the conflicts between the holders of power and its victims rapidly grew and became explicit.

However, outside those countries the millions of workers and socialist revolutionaries throughout the world continued to fight for the promises of the brilliant horizon of future associated with the idea of socialism. And the revolutionary critique of power began to confront both capitalism and the bureaucratic despotism of the 'socialist camp'. As Rudy Dutschke said at a rally in Berlin shortly before becoming the victim of an assassination attempt, a despotic power was visible that had begun to stretch from Washington to Vladivostok, and it was urgently necessary to confront it before it became even stronger.

It was, then, both alongside and separately from the hegemony of 'historical materialism' or 'Marxism-Leninism' that a new social movement took shape from the 1960s, aiming not only to subvert the capitalist-imperialist power but also that of the bureaucratic despotism of the 'socialist camp'. The aim was no longer just liberation of the workers from exploited labour, but liberation of people – all people – from domination and discrimination in all aspects of human life in society: work, sex, subjectivity, authority. That is, for workers, women, homosexuals, youth and victims of racial or ethnic discrimination, and for knowledge and the imaginary. The goal was not the full liberation of subjectivity, knowledge production's break

with its ties to power, liberation of the imagination and of all fields of culture (especially art) and defence of nature against human depredation (capitalist depredation in particular). The objective was the liberation of peoples from authority embodied in 'raison d'état'.

The struggle for the expansion and deepening of democracy in society, and not only in the nation-state, not just as a negotiation of the limits and conditions of exploitation and domination, and not just as a liberation from exploited labour, but above all as a materialization of the idea of social equality of peoples and as a legitimation of their diversity as a form of day-to-day relations among peoples in every sphere of social existence throughout the world, emerged as the brightest core of the new horizon of future. These were the proposals and images put forward by all the youth movements, in places as diverse as Shanghai in 1967, Paris in May 1968, Tlatelolco that same year, the streets of Prague in 1969 and the most active part of the youth movement in the USA, including the half million people who attended the festival of subversion at Woodstock.

A still brighter horizon began to take shape; in other words, a more radical and more global critical imaginary, which confronted both capitalism and the bureaucratic despotism of 'real socialism' at the same time.

After nearly a century, the debate on the state's place in the articulation of power was revived and the aim of every revolution now was liberation from the state, not its strengthening. What emerged was an imaginary dimension linked to liberating people from power – from all power. And as normally happens in history, music, the visual arts, poetry and literature were the forms of expression that most faithfully reflected this new imaginary dimension.

It is by no means surprising, from this point of view, that the two powers – private capitalism and bureaucratic despotism – have joined forces to defeat this new assault on heaven. And when they did, they were fully successful. But the outcome was this genuine historical disaster that I am now trying to make perceptible: the defeat of all the movements, organizations and regimes opposed to or rivalling capital and bureaucracy throughout the world, driving them to the brink of their extinction – and, hence, the extinction of a horizon which came to be totally and exclusively occupied by the predatory needs of financial capital.

The defeat of the worldwide revolutionary movement was also the defeat of the 'critical imaginary'. It did not last long enough to generate its own 'critical theory' of society. A decade or a decade and a half is undoubtedly not enough to move from a new imaginary dimension to the production of a new form of knowledge.

It is therefore also relevant to ask what happened to the previous so-called 'critical thought' and its product, the so-called 'critical theory of society', first, because that perspective on knowledge was the one that

oriented and conducted in practice the social actions undertaken to achieve the horizon of future, and second, because it was also the court that judged and evaluated the orientation and efficacy of actions.

Hegemony and the Crisis of Eurocentrism

I do not want to go any further on this subject. For the time being I merely reiterate what I have tried to demonstrate in other texts. First, this 'critical thought' and 'critical theory' of society were created in the context of the Eurocentric perspective of knowledge and in reference to the specific form of social power prevailing in Europe. Though already troubled by the principal epistemological difficulties of that perspective, the questions it asked about reality and its basic conceptual categories were developed in and for the European experience. Second, worldwide hegemony was achieved by the most definitely Eurocentric of the versions of this 'critical thought' and its respective 'critical theory': 'historical materialism' or 'Marxism-Leninism'. And that was the version which dominated the conduct of actions and the evaluation of their orientation and efficacy since the early 20th century. Third, that current of thought and social theory was fed from the beginning by the cognitive perspective of Eurocentrism, and its development has therefore been closely tied to the growing technocratization proper to that specific form of rationality.⁹

Over time this specific process of the globally dominant form of thought and social theory, which conducted and evaluated actions vis-a-vis the dominant power, generated a growing divide between the critical imaginary, concrete social experience and social theory. That divide became more and more perceptible, i.e. perceptible by more and more people, since the end of the Second World War.

The most profound trends in capitalism (not just in capital), which have led to the current situation, were already visible from the mid-1960s: growing limitations on the commodification of individual labour power, therefore 'structural unemployment', overaccumulation in some areas and underaccumulation in others, fragmentation of labour, technocratization of knowledge, reduction of opportunity to practise democracy. Because all of these trends were in conflict with an important process (that began after the Second World War) of deconcentration of the control of power, in most cases, and of effective redistribution of power, in a few others, they finally conflicted with a worldwide wave of questioning of the very foundations of capitalism's power, from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s.

That is why, when the worldwide crisis of capital broke out in the mid-1970s, for the great majority of the 'left' throughout the world it must have seemed that victories over capitalism were imminent. But it was not to be,

and that was not because people had begun to turn their backs on the critical imaginary, but because the globally hegemonic intellectual and political leadership had deepened and intensified its Eurocentric belonging and perspective. I therefore suggest posing this new question in the labyrinth: the worldwide defeat in the material dimension had previously occurred in the intellectual-political dimension. That defeat left most of the victims of capitalism in a vacuum. It allowed a minority to traverse the conformist paths of the imaginary dimension. But for the overwhelming majority of the professionals of knowledge, it led them to reinforce their Eurocentric propensities and turn their backs – with no psychological difficulties – on the cognitive components of the critical perspective on knowledge.

In the Time of Worldwide Resistance: A Return of the Future?

As the 1990s came to an end, the time of defeat was also approaching its end. Resistance against the most perverse trends of capitalism, subsumed under the term 'globalization', is already rising throughout the world. In Latin America, and in South America in particular, not one country is a stranger to the growing resistance of workers and the political instability generated by it.

This new period of social action in confrontation with world capitalist power has begun to develop in an almost totally transformed scenario – in its structure and its specific components, both material and intersubjective (social relations). In particular, this is happening at a time of near total reconcentration of the control of power in the hands of the dominant elites and of fragmentation and social deconcentration among the workers.

It is by no means inevitable that the conventional Eurocentric versions ('historical materialism') will prevail in leading the resistance. But it almost always happens that people begin to act not only in response to their problems and needs, but also by appealing to their memory to define the new situations and orient themselves in relation to them.

In any event, the worldwide resistance that has got under way implies – or may imply – the reconstruction of a critical imaginary and the rebuilding of a new horizon of future quite different from the one that has been extinguished. That new horizon is not yet visible. But if the resistance is not crushed, quickly and totally, it will indicate that there is a new anti-capitalist imaginary, a new horizon in the process of formulation. What historical images will it contain? For the time being they can only be guessed at, though their virtuality may already be recognizable: the one that was defeated and seemed to be dead and buried, the brightest hope of the 1960s, democracy as social equality and not just individual citizenship in the nation-state, as a legitimation of the diversity of peoples and the heterogeneity of their creations, as a liberation of life in society from all the forms and mechanisms

of exploitation, domination and discrimination, as a decolonization and liberation of thought and imagination, as the co-presence of social equality, social solidarity and the individual freedom of all people in all societies, tending to seek and produce another institutional universe in which it can really be expressed and defended. The disputes and combinations between the modern nation-state and the new community may be the field of expression for the search for new institutional forms of authority in which power is not present or is reduced and kept under control.

What is truly of interest in connection with this debate is the exploration – barely incipient but nonetheless necessary – of a parallel horizon of knowledge, a non-Eurocentric rationality that can also be part of the future horizon. In any event, it is a task to be addressed now.

Notes

This is a slightly revised version of a communication to the International Seminar on Geopolitics of Knowledge, Duke University, October 2000.

- 1 The article bearing that title, which preceded the book, was published in *World Affairs* in 1989. For my debate on the problem, see Quijano (1999).
- 2 Everyone will doubtless recall Aeschylus' Prometheus. I have no copy available as I write these notes, but I cite from memory his dialogue with the Oceanides who go to visit him after he has been chained:

'What have you done to deserve such a punishment?'
 'I have freed men from fear of death.'
 'And how have you achieved this miracle?'
 'I have made blind Hope take root among them.'
- 3 An extended discussion of this historical change can be found in Quijano (1989).
- 4 In the power of capital, the market is the floor for equality, but it is also its ceiling, i.e. its limit. Hence, in this system of power, equality cannot be practised other than as an ongoing conflict which, on the one hand, has led to an institutionalization of the negotiation of the limits, conditions and forms of domination/exploitation/conflict, expressed in the legal-political equality of social unequals and in the institutional universe of the modern nation-state. But on the other hand, this system generates continuous conflict, due to the steady reduction of those limits and the progressive expansion and intensification of inequality in society, which naturally breaks through the limits of the power held by capital and the modern nation-state. This relationship is contradictory and conflictual, but it is not avoidable. It is a historical necessity. In this specific and precise sense, it is a concrete social interest which defines modernity. See Quijano (2000).
- 5 It may have been in Italian cinema, and clearly by no means coincidentally, that the images of that break began to be produced for the first time, and as early as the 1960s. I remember especially the devastated consciousness, trapped between cynicism and anguish, in *We Loved Each Other so Much*.

- 6 See Rosa Luxemburg (1969, 1970). See his chapter on the Russian revolution (Pannekoek, 1948). The articles of Pannekoek, Gorter and others are compiled in *La Contrarevolution Bureaucratique* (1969). For Rodolfo Mondolfo see Mondolfo (1956).
- 7 It is interesting and intriguing to see that at the end of his principal book in this debate, *The Revolution Betrayed*, Trotsky appears to suspect that something more than a 'bureaucratic deformation' may have been under way in Russia (see Trotsky, 1938). There can be no other explanation for his suggestion that, if the situation were to last much longer, say for 50 years, it would become necessary to characterize it as another system of domination and exploitation. But there is no basis on which to infer an alternative theoretical position, nor the perspective on knowledge with which he suspects this evolution might be associated. His followers, the so-called Trotskyites, never took up that suggestion, even after the passage of those 50 years – not even when the notable book *Die Alternative* was published by Rudolf Bahro (1977). Its core thesis is precisely that the power created in Russia and in the 'socialist camp' as a whole was not socialist, but rather, a historically new pattern of domination and exploitation. See also Bahro (1981).
- 8 'The Dangers of Democracy' is the title of an article by Moscow mayor Gavrill Popov, the first elected mayor in Russia's history, after the collapse of the USSR (Popov, 1990). The ominous argument put forward by Popov, a professor of Marxism and dialectics until the eve of the Soviet system's collapse, is that the destruction of 'real socialism' in Russia was the outcome of an alliance between the working masses and the intelligentsia, though the two sectors pursued opposing interests: the masses wanted democracy to achieve social equality and control of power, while the intellectuals sought to create a new hierarchy in society. That is, the broader a democracy is, the more the masses will advance in the direction of social equality and against the interests of the intelligentsia. Hence, for Popov, democracy is a danger that must be controlled.
- 9 I have put forward certain proposals for debate on these issues in several writings. See, for example, Quijano (2000).

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